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The Prohibition of the Proposed Springer-ProSiebenSat.1-Merger:  
How much Economics in German Merger Control? 
Oliver Budzinski & Katharina Wacker
*
March 2007 
Abstract: We review the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office Germany) decision on the 
proposed merger between Springer and ProSiebenSat.1 from an economic point of view. In 
doing so, it is not our goal to analyse whether the controversial decision by the Bundeskar-
tellamt has been correct or flawed from a legal point of view. Instead, we analyse whether the 
economic reasoning in the decision document reflects state-of-the-art economic theory on 
conglomerate mergers. Regarding such types of mergers, anticompetitive effects either do not 
occur regularly or are more often than not overcompensated by efficiency gains, so that a 
standard welfare perspective demands reluctance concerning antitrust interventions. This is 
particularly true if two-sided markets, like media markets, are involved. However, anticompe-
titive conglomerate mergers are not impossible, in particular in neighbouring markets where 
there is some relationship between the products of the merging companies. In line with the 
more-economic approach in European merger control, a particular thorough line of argumen-
tation, backed with particularly convincing economic evidence, is necessary to justify a pro-
hibition of a conglomerate merger from an economic point of view. Against this background, 
we do not find the reasoning of the Bundeskartellamt entirely convincing and sufficiently 
strong to justify a prohibition of the proposed combination from an economic perspective. 
The reasons are that (i) the Bundeskartellamt fails to continuously consider consumer and 
customer welfare as the relevant standards, (ii) positive efficiency and welfare effects of 
cross-media strategies are neglected, (iii) in contrast, the competition agency sometimes ap-
pears to view profitability of post-merger strategy options to be per se anticompetitive (effi-
ciency offence), (iv) the incontestability of the relevant markets is not sufficiently substanti-
ated, (v) inconsistencies occur regarding the symmetry of the TV advertising market duopoly 
versus the unique role of the BILD-Zeitung and (vi) the employment of modern economic 
instruments appears to be underdeveloped. Thus, we conclude that the Bundeskartellamt has 
not embraced the European more-economic approach in the analysed decision. However, one 
can discuss whether economic effects are overcompensated in this case by concerns about a 
reduction in diversity of opinion and threats to free speech. Similar to the Bundeskartellamt, 
we do not consider these concerns in our analysis.  
Keywords: merger control, media markets, more-economic approach, conglomerate mergers, 
cross-promotion 
JEL-Code: L82, L40, K21 
 
                                                 
*  Dr. Oliver Budzinski, Visiting Professor, Philipps-University of Marburg, Department of Econom-
ics, email: oliver.budzinski@staff.uni-marburg.de. Katharina Wacker, Economist, Heinrich-Heine-
University of Düsseldorf, Department of Economics, email: k.wacker@uni-duesseldorf.de. We 
thank Arndt Christiansen and Franziska Kohl for valuable comments on earlier versions of this pa-
per and Barbara Güldenring for editorial assistance. 
 Budzinski/Wacker: Springer-ProSiebenSat.1-Merger   2 
1 Introduction   
During the recent reform process of European Merger Control, the so-called ‘more-
economic approach’ has been introduced (Christiansen 2006; Neven 2006; Röller/De 
La Mano 2006). Its core idea is that merger decisions shall be based upon sound eco-
nomic analysis with thorough reception of modern economic concepts, theories and 
instruments. The state-of-the-art of competition economics ought to be the yardstick 
for the assessment of mergers. According to the more-economic approach in Euro-
pean merger control, the net effect of a merger on consumer welfare represents the 
adequate criterion in order to distinguish between anti- and procompetitive mergers. 
Merger control within the European Union, however, can be characterised as a two-
level system of merger reviewing jurisdictions (Budzinski/Christiansen 2005; Budzin-
ski 2006): next to merger control according to the EC Merger Regulation and en-
forced by the European Commission, the competition laws of the Member States ap-
ply to mergers with predominantly national scope (in terms of the geographical distri-
bution of turnovers) and the competition authorities of the Member States enforce 
these rules. Since the Member States are extensively autonomous regarding the shape 
and practice of their merger control regimes, the more-economic approach merely 
affects the European level. However, it represents an interesting question, to what 
extent the Member State merger control regimes adhere to modern economic reason-
ing when reviewing and assessing a proposed merger. However, this is hardly touched 
upon in the literature so far. As a small step into this direction, we analyse the pro-
posed merger between the Axel Springer AG and the ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG, two 
German media companies, which was notified to the Bundeskartellamt (German Fed-
eral Cartel Office) under the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB; 
German Law against Restrictions of Competition) on August 12, 2005 and eventually 
prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt with its decision on January 19, 2006 (Bundeskar-
tellamt 2006). The relevant prohibition criterion is that the merger must not create or 
strengthen a dominant position (§ 36 GWB). We review the prohibition decision 
against the background of the compatibility of its reasoning with modern economic 
theories and, in doing so, attempt to assess to what extent German merger control 
incorporated the more-economic approach in this particular case. 
2  Springer-ProSiebenSat.1 and the Economics of Conglomerate Mergers  
First of all, we present the parties involved in this case and the relevant markets iden-
tified by the Bundeskartellamt. As a second step we give a survey of the economics of 
conglomerate merger because this provides the basis for the prohibition arguments 
reviewed in section 3. Before that we explore the issue in how far media markets are 
different and what consequences this may have for the assessment of competition.  
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2.1  The Parties, the Relevant Markets, and Market Shares  
The acquisition of the German TV-network ProSiebenSat.1 by Axel Springer, one of 
the largest German publishing companies, was announced and notified to the 
Bundeskartellamt in August 2005. Five months later, after several hearings and pro-
ceedings, the German competition authority eventually decided to block the merger. 
The commitments offered by the merging parties did not suffice to have the merger 
cleared. According to the Bundeskartellamt, the merger would have led to a strength-
ening of already existing dominant positions, in particular because of cross-market 
effects between TV and newspaper markets. More specifically, the Bundeskartellamt 
held (i) a strengthening of collective dominance on the TV advertising market, (ii) a 
strengthening of single-firm dominance on the national advertising market for news-
papers and (iii) a strengthening of single-firm dominance on the national reader mar-
ket for over-the-counter newspapers. 
   Axel Springer AG (AS) is a listed German media company, particularly en-
gaged in the business of newspapers, magazines and new media. Furthermore, 
AS is involved in various other areas of the media business, e.g. regional radio 
stations, printing and distribution of own and foreign print products, content 
production for private and public TV stations. In particular AS already holds a 
substantial share in one of the TV stations belonging to the ProSiebenSat.1-
Group.  
   ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG (P7S1) acts as holding for one of two leading pri-
vate TV-Groups in Germany. P7S1 operates five Free-TV-stations and is en-
gaged in the marketing and commercialisation of its stations as well as in au-
dio-visual productions (news, magazines, talk shows, etc.), predominantly for 
its own stations. 
Media companies generally participate in two separate good markets: in the first one, 
some kind of content is marketed to consumers, whereas the second market involves 
the selling of advertising. Here, advertisers demand access to the audience using the 
media content. Basically, this dual product market structure characterizes every media 
product (partly) financed by advertising. So-called Free-TV-stations that are com-
pletely financed by advertising revenues (and/or public fees), so that consumers do 
not have to pay directly for the program or a specific broadcast (in contrast to Pay-TV 
and pay-per-view systems), also participate in these two markets. However, a direct 
monetary relationship only exists in the advertising market. Therefore, the 
Bundeskartellamt (2006: 23–29) denies a relevant audience market for Free-TV-
programs. In consequence, the one relevant TV market is the TV advertising market. 
Nevertheless, the audience share is indirectly regarded as being an important factor 
(success measure) due to its influence on a station’s advertising revenues and position 
on the advertising market.  
Figure 1 shows the market shares of both the TV audience market and the TV adver-
tising market. While the audience market is characterised by four similar strong play-
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ers with considerable fringe competition, the TV advertising market is dominated by 
two private TV-networks (P7S1 and RTLGroup). Public television (ARD and ZDF) 
attracts more than 40 % of the overall audience but is restricted concerning its offer-
ing on the advertising market due to its character as predominantly financed through 
public fees. As a consequence, the TV advertising market shows a duopoly by P7S1 
and the RTLGroup, each representing a 45 % market share. The RTLGroup is a sub-
sidiary of Bertelsmann, the major media company in Germany and one of the largest 
world-wide. Besides the RTLGroup, other major subsidiaries of Bertelsmann are 
Random House (books), SonyBMG (music) and Gruner+Jahr (magazines).
1 Together 
with AS, Bertelsmann (via Gruner+Jahr) is engaged in the rotogravure company Pri-
novis. Apart from its pre-merger share in P7S1, AS is no considerable player on the 
TV market.
2
















































ARD includes regional stations (“Dritte Programme”).   
Source: Compiled from Bundeskartellamt (2006).  
Instead, AS core competence is the newspaper market, where the AS product “BILD-
Zeitung”, Germany’s leading daily boulevard newspaper, stands out. As newspapers 
are not distributed freely, both the newspaper reader market and the newspaper adver-
tising market are relevant. Concerning the reader market, the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 
                                                 
1  Gruner+Jahr publishes numerous weekly and monthly magazines, the most well-known of which is 
STERN. Via Gruner+Jahr Bertelsmann also has an interest in the SPIEGEL Verlag.  
2  Additionally, AS holds a 27% share in “Hamburg 1”, a regional TV station with negligible market 
shares. 
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41–42) distinguishes over-the-counter newspapers from subscription newspapers.
3 
This market delineation has been accepted by the German courts in the past
4 but, nev-
ertheless, received a controversial reception in the academic literature (Wessely 1995: 
140-160; Dewenter/Kaiser 2005; Säcker 2005; von Wallenberg 2007). Sticking with 
the market definition of the competition agency, the reader market for over-the-
counter newspapers is almost monopolized by AS’s BILD, which is the only over-the-
counter newspaper distributed nation-wide (see table 1). The market for newspaper 
advertising, by contrast, comprises all newspapers irrespective of the way they are 
offered.
5 Here, AS reaches a market share of about 50 %, with BILD alone having a 
market share of more than 35 % (see table 1). AS doubles the share of the second 
largest newspaper (up to 25 %). P7S1 is not involved in the newspaper markets. 
Table 1: Relevant Newspaper Market Shares in 2004  
Newspaper  Reader Market  
Share (%) 
Advertising Market  
Share (%) 
BILD 77 40–45
Other AS newspapers  4  5 
AS in total  81  max. 50 
FAZ  – 20–25 
Süddeutsche Zeitung  –  10–15 
Handelsblatt –  5–10 
Express Köln/Bonn  4  < 1 
Abendzeitung 3  <  1 
Tz München  3  < 1 
Berliner Kurier*  3  < 1 
Hamburger MoPo*  2  < 1 
MoPo für Sachsen
+ 2 <  1 
Financial Times D.
+ – <  1 
Others 2  <  10 
*: Since 2006 belonging to BV Deutsche Zeitungsholding owned by the British 
Mecom Group; 
+: belonging to Gruner+Jahn. 
Data source: compiled from Bundeskartellamt (2006).  
Consequently, the proposed merger of AS and P7S1 does not lead to an addition of 
market shares, neither on the TV markets, nor on the newspaper markets. There are, 
however, two other markets where both companies are doing business. On the market 
for online advertising, AS accomplishes a market share of less than 5 % with P7S1 
attaining less than 1 %. Regarding the German market for the production of TV 
broadcasts (shows, magazines, etc.), AS accomplishes a market share of less than 10 
% through its subsidiary Schwartzkopff TV. P7S1 remains under 1 % if in-house pro-
                                                 
3  According to the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 41–42), subscription newspapers differ from over-the-
counter newspapers regarding broadness and depth of coverage, design and illustration as well as 
the focal points of news and reports.  
4 See WuW/E BGH 1854, 1857 "Zeitungsmarkt München" and WuW/E BGH 2425, 2428   
"Niederrheinische Anzeigenblätter". 
5  The Bundeskartellamt considers separating newspapers published on Sunday but that does not 
change market positions fundamentally. 
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ductions are neglected. In summary, the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 66) cannot identify 
any anticompetitive horizontal effects in these markets as a consequence of the pro-
posed concentration. Thus, the prohibition of the merger rests on cross-market (con-
glomerate) effects. 
2.2  The Economics of Conglomerate Mergers  
Essentially, the proposed merger between Springer and ProSiebenSat.1 is character-
ised as being a conglomerate merger with the main relevant markets being TV adver-
tising (ProSiebenSat.1) and over-the-counter newspapers (Springer) (Bundeskar-
tellamt 2006: 23). According to the state-of-the-art of competition economics, con-
glomerate mergers are generally held to be less dangerous to competition than vertical 
and, particularly, horizontal ones. Moreover, conglomerate mergers are often believed 
to involve efficiency gains that generally exceed merely negligible competition ef-
fects (Bishop et al. 2005: 73-104). Therefore, since rational enterprises decide to en-
gage in a conglomerate merger only if they expect efficiencies and since considerable 
anticompetitive effects are unlikely, competition authorities on the European level are 
required to prove adverse effects particularly diligent and precise in order to justify 
antitrust action against a conglomerate merger.
6
However, from an economic perspective, this assessment – in its generality – merely 
holds for pure conglomerate mergers where the products of the merging companies 
are independent from each other, i.e. they do not stand in a horizontal or vertical rela-
tion with each other (Church 2004: 3). Things change if conglomerate mergers in 
neighbouring markets are concerned (Church 2004: 2–3). This refers to the recently 
frequent phenomenon of mergers between companies whose products do not fall into 
the same relevant market, but the different relevant markets are somewhat (comple-
mentary or substitutive) interrelated – though beneath the threshold to constitute a 
common relevant market. In Tetra Laval-Sidel, for instance, markets for carton bever-
age packaging and PET beverage packaging did not belong to the same relevant mar-
ket according to standard SSNIP-styled analysis. However, they do not represent 
completely independent markets, like the markets for cars and refrigerators in the 
1980s Daimler-Benz-AEG-merger. Similarly, the markets for aircraft engines and 
avionics in GE-Honeywell represent such neighbouring markets (while Tetra is about 
substitutive relation, GE is about complementary relation). Springer-ProSiebenSat.1 
also belongs into the category of conglomerate mergers in neighbouring markets since 
TV and newspapers are not completely independent from each other. Therefore, we 
briefly review the economics of such types of conglomerate mergers in this section. 
                                                 
6  See for instance the recent CFI rulings in Tetra/Laval Sidel and General Electric/Honeywell (Tem-
ple Lang 2003; Grant/Neven 2005; Howarth 2005; Baxter/Dethmers/Dodoo 2006). 
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Anticompetitive concerns in neighbouring markets typically refer to leveraging prob-
lems, i.e. the leverage of market power from one market into another one (Nalebuff 
2005). Standard instruments are fourfold (Church 2004: 130): 
−  Tying occurs when the purchase of good A requires that costumers also purchase 
good B. 
− Pure  bundling is quite similar to tying, referring to the case where customers can 
buy a good A only in a bundle with product B.
7 Mixed bundling occurs if A and B 
can be bought individually but customers have to pay a higher price compared to 
the bundled offer. 
−  Foreclosure can occur in the meaning of “not supplying a rival with access to the 
complements controlled by the conglomerate: if consumers value variety, then the 
variety advantage can provide the conglomerate with market power or lead to mo-
nopolization” (Church 2004: 130) (Ma 1997; Church/Gandal 2000). 
−  Financial leverage and predation. 
Tying and bundling can produce anticompetitive effects if the merger involves (or 
creates) a dominant firm in one of the markets, which is additionally protected by 
entry barriers (Church 2004: 148–219; Tirole 2005). Then, under certain circum-
stances, market power in market A can be leveraged into market B through tying 
strategies (Whinston 1990; Tirole 2005). Furthermore, tying can be employed to 
maintain or enhance market power in market A, for instance, by preventing entry into 
market A (Whinston 1990; Carlton/Waldman 2002). Additionally, negative welfare 
effects might result from the effects of tying strategies on innovation (Farrell/Katz 
2000;  Choi/Stefanadis 2001; Choi 2004). Under the aforementioned assumptions, 
bundling strategies, on the one hand, might lead to relaxing price competition through 
segmenting the market with competitive pressure, creating niches of monopoly (Car-
bajo et al. 1990; Seidmann 1990; Chen 1997). On the other hand, bundling might cre-
ate strategic substitutes (i.e. the bundles being more substitutional than the original 
products) (Martin 1999), thus offering scope for quasi-horizontal exclusionary ef-
fects. If the affected markets can be viewed as markets for components of a system, 
then a conglomerate merger across the component markets creates one integrated sys-
tem supplier (which cannot be copied because it incontestably dominates one of the 
component markets; remember assumptions at the beginning of this paragraph), offer-
ing various avenues to employ exclusionary practices including artificial incompati-
bilities (Denicolo 2000; Nalebuff 2000; Choi 2004). 
Although conglomerate mergers in neighbouring markets entail an increased prob-
ability of anticompetitive effects of these types when compared to conglomerate 
mergers in non-related markets, still efficiency rationales may speak in favour of such 
a combination of assets. Consumers might benefit from distribution cost savings, 
compatibility cost savings, information and liability advantages as well as market 
                                                 
7  The difference occurs in terms of divisibility: bundling includes prescribed quantity relations (e.g. 
you can buy two units of A in a bundle with four units of B). Tying does not allow this. 
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segmentation and creation resulting from tying and bundling. Additionally, socially 
desirable improvements of the protection of intellectual property might occur (gener-
ally and comprehensively: Bishop et al. 2005: 73-104; Tirole 2005: 14–17). Kolasky 
(2005: 164) summarizes: “U.S. law has long considered that antitrust agencies should 
very rarely interfere with conglomerate mergers. On the contrary, it is recognized that 
such mergers have the potential to generate significant efficiencies: the injection of 
capital; the improvement of management efficiency; the transfer of know-how and best 
practices across traditional industry boundaries; and the increased ability to get by dur-
ing economic downturns through diversification. In addition, conglomerate mergers 
provide a market for owner-managers to sell the businesses that they create, thereby 
encouraging enterprise and risk-taking. The European Community’s concern with theo-
ries that have been long abandoned in the United States is probably misplaced. Greater 
faith should be placed in the competitive process rather than worrying about competi-
tors who may be less efficient than the merged entity.” 
With imperfect capital markets, a conglomerate merger may create scope for financial 
leverage and predation (Church 2004: 260–280). If the conglomerate enjoys incon-
testable market power in market A, it can finance a predatory pricing strategy on mar-
ket B through cross-subsidization in order to leverage its market power to the pre-
merger competitive market B. Furthermore, credible threats (referring to its ‘deep 
pocket’) might deter potential competitors from entering market B. However, a num-
ber of additional elements are required in order to make a financial predation strategy 
sufficiently probable (Bolton/Brodley/Riordan 2000): the prey company depends on 
external financing, based on its performance, and predation sufficiently reduces its 
performance, thus threatening its continuing financing and thus its viability; a facili-
tating market structure (high concentration and entry barriers in market B); probable 
recoupment; absence of a credible efficiency justification. 
A different line of thought claims that conglomerate mergers may favour coordinated 
effects by creating additional punishment instruments, in particular multimarket con-
tact (Church 2004: 254–259). Post-merger coordination becomes facilitated if the 
merger makes the multimarket competitors more symmetric. If company I pre-merger 
competed on market A with company III and company II pre-merger competed on 
market B with company III, a merger I+II creates two symmetric companies, both 
competing on markets A and B with each other. However, several more conditions 
must be fulfilled (e.g. homogeneous products on each market A and B, sufficient 
market transparency, few competitors in both markets, considerable entry barriers, 
stable economic environment, past experience with coordination) in order to establish 
likely coordinated effects. 
2.3  Economic Competition on Media Markets  
Media markets are characterized by a number of specific features that distinguishes 
them from ‘ordinary’ markets. First, we briefly review some economic specifics, and 
then we briefly address the interrelation of economic competition and journalistic 
diversity that frustrates an economics-only analysis of media markets. Nevertheless, 
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economic competition represents an important element of media markets and, there-
fore, a competitive analysis is definitely part of the story of a media merger. 
Considering the characteristics of public goods, one must distinguish between infor-
mation or content itself and the means by which it is distributed. While there is no 
rivalry for information itself and no one can be excluded from an information once it 
is published, there are means to exclude individuals from a print product containing 
information. Even a television program broadcasted free-to-air is supplied although 
viewers are not excluded through the price mechanism. Instead a second product, 
namely advertising space as a normal private good is tied with the public good con-
tent, in order to finance it. So, the problem of public goods is solved by the market 
itself through bundling content with advertising. Improved exclusion techniques, like 
cable television and the digitalisation of distribution channels, make it even easier to 
supply subscription-based TV-programs.  
However, the dualism of content and advertising establishes a so-called two-sided 
market characterised by a strong economic correlation between the outcome in the 
two markets, e.g. audience share and advertising revenue (Dewenter 2004; Ander-
son/Gabszewicz 2006). If a TV-program reaches a high audience share advertisers are 
very interested in transmitting their commercials in this program. The great demand 
for advertising space leads to high advertising revenue that enables the station to fur-
ther improve its attractiveness. This again will boost the advertising demand and so 
on. As a consequence, media enterprises face the task of optimising its price structure 
in order to maximise the combined revenue of the two market sides. This is true for 
the newspaper market but not entirely true for Free-TV because of the missing price 
relationship between stations and viewers.
8 From an economic point of view the bias 
of market outcome in media markets caused by externalities is presumably of no 
greater importance than in many other markets. The same applies to imperfect infor-
mation. Like utilities in the energy or transportation sector, some media distribution 
channels are characterised by subadditive cost structures. This may lead to natural 
monopoly, e.g. in cable television, but it is of no relevance in the present case because 
no distribution market is regarded.
9  
In summary, despite some market imperfections and sector specifics, media markets 
in principle can be subject to competition-economics analysis (Dewenter 2004; 
Anderson/Gabszewicz 2006). However, inextricably intertwined with the economic 
aspects of media markets, there exist important non-economic goals, such as freedom 
of speech and pluralism, that give reasons for a media-specific regulatory framework 
in addition to general competition law. The interrelation of economic competition and 
journalistic pluralism on media markets remains a difficult and insufficiently explored 
                                                 
8 Consequently, the Free-TV market fails to match the definition of two-sided markets by 
Rochet/Tirole (2004: 26). 
9 For a more detailed analysis of the question in how far market failure in the TV market   
justifies sector-specific regulation see Wacker (2007). 
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subject. As a consequence, the co-existence of competition policy and sectoral media 
policy is quite typical. Sectoral policy is said to be superior in order to achieve objec-
tives, like diversity and the promotion of pluralism of views (supporting the democ-
ratic formation of public opinion) (Motta/Polo 1997). The competitive market equi-
librium may show a differentiation of contents, but this outcome does not necessarily 
involve the representation of political views. Moreover persistent concentration, 
driven by the high cost of the more attractive contents, remains a major limit to the 
realisation of pluralism within the market. Due to lobbying motivations of media 
owners, pluralism within a single media cannot be expected either. (Polo 2005). Di-
vergences and incompatibilities between economic efficiency oriented policies (for 
instance, tolerating a higher degree of concentration in the name of higher efficiency) 
and such that promote pluralism support a separation of powers (Motta/Polo 1997: 
321).  
In Germany, this is reflected by two different institutions and the laws involved in 
media mergers. The Bundeskartellamt reviews the economic effects of media mergers 
according to the general competition law (GWB). Besides, the Kommission zur Er-
mittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich (KEK, sector-specific regulatory au-
thority commissioned to investigate concentration in broadcasting) examines, if plu-
ralism and diversity are threatened according to the requirements of the Rundfunk-
staatsvertrag (RStV, broadcast-specific regulatory framework). As this paper focuses 
on the decision of the Bundeskartellamt, we will only analyse the economic effects of 
the proposed merger on competition in the markets involved. This neither implies that 
economic effects are more important than non-economic effects, nor that the prohibi-
tion by the KEK (2006) is less controversial.
10 Our choice merely reflects the goal of 
the paper to analyse the extent and quality of economic reasoning in a landmark deci-
sion on the Member-State level of the European Merger Control System.  
3  A Review of the Prohibition Arguments of the German Cartel Office from an 
Economic Perspective 
The decision of the Bundeskartellamt is founded particularly on two arguments:  
−  the merger stabilizes and increases the collective dominance of P7S1 and 
RTLGroup on the TV advertising market by enhancing incentives for coordinated 
behaviour within the duopoly (section 3.1). 
−  the merger strengthens the already dominant position of AS on the reader and on 
the advertising market for newspapers because of cross-media strategies, which 
can profitably be employed by AS-P7S1 post-merger (section 3.2). 
                                                 
10 See for controversial assessments of the (quality of the) KEK-decision Lange (2005), Möschel 
(2005), Bornemann (2006), Gounalakis/Zagouras (2006), Hain (2006), and Säcker (2006). 
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3.1  Strengthening of Collective Dominance (TV-Markets) 
As outlined in the last paragraph of section 2.2, a conglomerate merger can poten-
tially strengthen an existing collective dominance and, thus, increase concerns about 
anticompetitive coordinated oligopoly effects. Since a conglomerate merger does not 
reduce the number of competitors, an increased probability of coordinated effects 
predominantly arises if the merger leads to multimarket contact (improved retaliation 
mechanism), (thereby) making the oligopolists more symmetric, and increases barri-
ers to entry. In order to derive anticompetitive effects, two steps of analysis are nec-
essary: first, an existing collective dominance of the RTLGroup-P7S1 duopoly on the 
TV advertising market must be proved, i.e. a lack of competition between RTLGroup 
and P7S1 pre-merger (Bundeskartellamt 2006: 29-38), and, second, it must be dem-
onstrated how this coordinated behaviour becomes stabilised or increased post-merger 
(Bundeskartellamt 2006: 38-41).  
3.1.1 Uncompetitive  Duopoly? 
The task of identifying coordinated effects belongs to the most challenging ones in 
merger control, because tight oligopolies tend to the extremes: the recognition of 
strong mutual interdependence of the competitors can either induce fierce competition 
or coordinated behaviour (uncompetitive co-existence). Economic oligopoly theory 
has identified a set of market characteristics that increase the likelihood of coordi-
nated equilibria at the expense of competitive rivalry, namely (i) a limited number of 
competitors, (ii) a high degree of homogeneity in terms of products and cost struc-
tures, (iii) a high level of market transparency, (iv) significant barriers to entry, (v) 
the absence of significant buyer power, (vi) a low probability of detection and legal 
sanctions, (vii) multi-market contacts, (viii) past experience with coordination, and 
(ix) a stable economic environment.
11
In line with contemporary economic thinking, the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 29-38) 
convincingly identifies a considerable number of market characteristics that facilitate 
coordinated effects. In the first place, the TV advertising market is without doubt 
highly concentrated and dominated by two players – RTLGroup and P7S1 with more 
or less constant market shares over the last years of about 40 % each. It seems to be 
less obvious, however, that the marketed products are homogeneous since it matters 
whether an advertising minute is aired during a popular movie at prime time or a spe-
cial interest broadcast at midnight. However, similar to other media markets, like the 
music industry
12, RTLGroup and P7S1 can be viewed to offer a comparable range of 
products, so that the complete package of offered advertising environment is rather 
homogeneous. Consequently, a homogeneous average cost structure result. Addition-
                                                 
11 See Aigner/Budzinski/Christiansen (2006: 312-319) for a review of the economic theory of coordi-
nated effects and the evolution of the European Commission’s collective dominance policy. 
12 See, for instance, the reasoning in the Sony-BMG merger case (Aigner/Budzinski/Christiansen 
2006). 
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ally, market transparency is considerably high and sufficient buyer power cannot be 
identified. 
Two other assessments seem to be more problematic from an economic perspective. 
Firstly, the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 31–34) substantiates its assessment that 
RTLGroup and P7S1 form an ‘uncompetitive duopoly’ by the parallel development of 
market shares and prices. Figure 2 shows the development of TV advertising revenues 
in Germany for the major players. 


















Source: SevenOne Media 2006. 
The Bundeskartellamt (2006: 31) points out that in a market environment of declining 
advertising revenues, constant market shares persisting over several years argue 
against substantial competition between the actual players. In fact, however, the mar-
ket volume is not declining in general. After a steady market expansion in the eighties 
and nineties due to the market entries of private stations, in the last years it is more 
likely to show a kind of cyclical movement because the demand for advertising is not 
irrespective of business cycles. Nevertheless, the market shares have not varied sig-
nificantly during the last years, neither for the whole groups as shown in figure 2 nor 
for single stations. According to economic theory, however, constant market shares 
(on an annual basis) and parallel movements of average prices do not suffice for the 
conclusion that no competition takes place (Buccirossi 2006).  
Concerning parallel price movements, it should be considered that prices are usually 
adjusted during a year according to the success of a program, which is not visible in 
prices averaged over all programs of one station (or group of stations) for one year. 
The competition agency relies on the latter indicator, which might be problematic. 
Furthermore, the higher price level after 8 p.m. is not only (and maybe to a lesser ex-
tent) caused by lessening competition due to the restriction for public stations not to 
show spots after 8 p.m. as argued by Bundeskartellamt (2006: 34). Instead, it is driven 
by the goal of reaching a greater audience at this prime time, particularly concerning 
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the preferred target group of individuals between the ages of 14–49. Consequently, 
the most attractive content is then broadcasted. Due to this preference for the prime 
time period, firms demanding advertising capacities are willing to pay a higher price 
per contact (or per thousand contacts as it is commonly standardized). The preference 
for greater audience and the higher willingness to pay can also be recognized by com-
paring the prices per thousand contacts of the minor stations (e.g. Vox, Kabel 1) with 
those of the main stations of each group (e.g. RTL, Sat.1). Interestingly, the prices of 
the public stations reach a level significantly above those of the most attractive pri-
vate stations
13, which is not discussed by the cartel office.  
Nevertheless, the striking convergence of prices during the 1990s and a simultaneous 
anouncement of price increase (justified by almost identical wording) led to earlier 
investigations by the Bundeskartellamt in 1999 (KEK 2000: 206). This indication of 
past experience with anticompetitive conduct strengthens the case of the competition 
agency. However, at the same time, there are great incentives to break a collusion. 
Because TV stations face a cost structure characterized by a great share of fixed costs 
for programming and very small marginal costs for advertisement booking, the sta-
tions are interested in using their full capacity. Therefore, the incentive to cut prices 
at short notice and thereby break the cartel agreement is comparatively high. The in-
centives for cheating are also supported by practices to allow ex post discounts 
(Kruse 2000: 40). As a consequence, the observed simultaneous movements of prices 
may also be a case of justified parallel behaviour (Rott 2003: 250). Another neglected 
issue is whether the noted parallel development of audience market shares 
(Bundeskartellamt 2006: 33) might cause (justify) a parallel development of advertis-
ing market shares. 
Furthermore, competitive actions concerning programming should be taken into ac-
count. As the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 23) declares there is no separate ‘market’ for 
audiences but there is a strong link between the two because the successs on the ad-
vertising market is determined by the audience shares. And in fact the program con-
tent is maybe the most important means a station can adapt to influence not only its 
audience level and share but also its advertising revenues. It happens frequently that 
shows not fulfilling expectations are stopped or moved to time periods with generally 
less audience. Beyond that, sequences of innovation and imitation can be observed as 
well. So, on closer examination the competitive situation may be more differentiated 
than illustrated by a glance at advertising market shares and average prices.  
Secondly, the issue of entry barriers deserves a closer look. The Bundeskartellamt 
(2006: 36–37) is certainly right to conclude that the other competitors on the TV ad-
vertising market are currently not able to exert sufficient competitive pressure on the 
duopolists. This includes the mighty public stations since they are not allowed to 
broadcast advertisement spots beyond the time frame from 5 to 8 p.m. on weekdays. 
                                                 
13 While the public stations must not broadcast commercials after 8 p.m., they legally engage in pro-
gram sponsorship, for instance “company X presents the movie Y”. 
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The competition agency is certainly correct in refraining from taking into considera-
tion that this regulation might be (or might not be) liberalised in the long run in the 
face of a increasingly controversial discussion about the value and height of TV fi-
nancing through public fees. Furthermore, the remaining private stations are special-
ised on specific niches.  
Regarding potential newcomers, the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 36–37, 41) holds with-
out much reasoning that they will find it hard to compete with the established stations 
becausee of substantial barriers to entry and barriers of mobilty in the German TV 
market. This stands in line with previous analyses of media markets (e.g. Rott 2003: 
161). However, one must wonder whether this is still valid. One prominent reason for 
entry barriers has always been frequency scarcity. In the face of satellite TV and the 
increased role of digital technologies in terrestrial and cable broadcasting, this prob-
lem has already lost and will further loose much of its significance.
14 Another re-
markable entry barrier is represented by the ability to offer a full-range program, 
which in the first place is restricted by the availability and price of intellectual prop-
erty rights (shows, concepts, etc.). However, existing entry barriers must be compared 
to the abilities and resources of potential entrants in order to assess their deterrence 
effect. TV markets have been national and so was the scope of the players. However, 
more recently a wave of internationalisation activities by big media companies has 
accelerated (Nikolinakos 2004; Idot 2006). Potential entrants into the German TV 
market include big European and American TV networks, which dispose over sub-
stantial financial resources as well as comprehensive broadcasting rights, etc. The 
decision of the German competition agency does not clarify sufficiently why entry 
barriers should be too high for such potential competitors. The Bundeskartellamt 
(2006: 37–38) merely hints to the fact that no successful major entry has taken place 
in the last couple of years. Apart from not being entirely indicative for future entries 
in and of itself, the lack of entries can alternatively be explained pro-competitively: 
the absence of supra-competitive profits might have rendered entry into the German 
TV market less attractive.
15 Eventually, the ongoing trend towards a convergence of 
media might lead to a more integrated media market – both regarding different media 
types (e.g. internet TV) and the geographic scope – thereby bringing new dynamics 
and new competitors into the market (Chon et al. 2003; Bernitz 2006: 198–199; 
                                                 
14  Besides, the need for a broadcast licence from one of the regional authorities   
(Landesmedienanstalten) constitutes some kind of an institutional barrier to entry. In fact, the   
conditions that must be met in order to get a licence can be characterized as general minimum  
requirements that are the same for all market participants and their fulfilment constitutes a claim for 
the licence. Thus, the licensing procedure is not per se discriminatory. Furthermore, the KEK must 
consider possible risks for the diversity of opinion (e.g. caused by concentration of ownership). For 
detailed information see the relevant wording of the law   
in the RStV (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), available at http://www.lfm-nrw.de/downloads/rstv_8.pdf, 
and in addition for example in the Landesmediengesetz NRW, available at http://www.lfm-
nrw.de/recht/landesmediengesetz/. 
15 Interpreted this way, the allegedly anticompetitive parallel movement of prices discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs may well be viewed as a result of fierce competition, driving prices to their 
competitive level. 
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Bohne 2006: 546–548; Idot 2006: 185–186). However, this can also be abused to cre-
ate monopolies in distinct media markets, as the Italian example shows (Kremmyda 
2006: 194). Taking all this into consideration, one must conclude that it is not satisfy-
ing to simply claim prohibitive entry barriers in tradition with past cases. Instead, the 
subject of entry barriers to the German TV advertising market would have merited a 
more elaborate and insightful economic analysis. 
3.1.2  Conglomerate Effects, Symmetry, and the Role of “BILD” 
So, to what extent does the conglomerate combination of P7S1’s TV stations and 
AS’s newspaper BILD strengthen the collective dominance on the TV advertising 
markets? Since the barriers to entry-problematic basically runs along the same lines 
as discussed in the preceding section, we will concentrate on multimarket contacts 
and an enhanced symmetry of Bertelsmann-RTLGroup and AS-P7S1 post-merger. 
The Bundeskartellamt (2006: 38-41) outlines that the merger would lead to a further 
assimilation of the corporate structures of the two conglomerates (Bertelsmann-
RTLGroup, AS-P7S1), which post-merger both include TV and print markets (AS-
P7S1 predominantly newspapers and magazines, Bertelsmann-RTLGroup predomi-
nantly magazines and books). The merger would also result in a number of interlocks 
between them. All in all this would further secure and strengthen the duopoly in the 
TV advertising market (Bundeskartellamt 2006: 38). The more the market and corpo-
rate structures of oligopolists resemble each other, the more likely they will be able to 
stabilize parallel behaviour. The increasing symmetry between the two conglomerates 
raises the number of fields in which the duopolists are able to retaliate divergent be-
haviour (disciplining force of multimarket contact). Last but not least the cartel office 
stresses the unique potential of AS’s newspaper BILD to serve as a substitute for TV 
advertising, which would be omitted if AS and P7S1 merged.  
Stressing the unique market position and characteristics of BILD is a recurrent pattern 
in the line of argumentation of the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 18, 39, 42, 43, 55, 57, 58, 
62, 64). This position as the single nationwide daily over-the-counter newspaper, 
reaching much more consumers than any single other newspaper, is responsible for a 
large part of the allegedly anticompetitive effects of the merger.
16 Indeed, if BILD 
had not possessed such a unique market position, most of the anticompetitive con-
cerns would not have played a role at all. However, the extraordinary, incommensur-
able character of BILD stands in contrast to the claim that the merger makes the TV 
advertising oligopolists more symmetric. Bertelsmann produces a prominent (weekly) 
political magazine (DER SPIEGEL) as well as some regional newspapers
17 but fun-
damentally nothing comparable to BILD
18. Therefore, one could argue in favour of an 
                                                 
16  See next to the reasoning so far in particular section 3.2. 
17  These are Sächsische Zeitung, MoPo Sachsen. 
18 The only nationwide newspaper of Bertelsmann is the Financial Times Deutschland, a niche product 
with a negligible market share on the newspapers advertising market. 
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improved multimarket contact because both conglomerates now combine TV and 
print media
19, but only at the expense of qualifying the incontestable one-of-a-kind 
character of BILD, which, then, must be viewed under stronger competitive pressure 
by other print media. Thus, on the one hand, the Bundeskartellamt argues that the 
merger is anticompetitive because of the exceptional position of BILD, on the other 
hand the merger is deemed anticompetitive because it makes Bertelsmann-RTLGroup 
and AS-P7S1 more symmetric.  
This obvious contradiction is addressed by claiming that BILD represents a fringe 
competitor to the duopoly on the TV advertising market. “The Bild-Zeitung currently 
represents the sole alternative – outside the relevant market – for advertisers concern-
ing TV advertisement with Bertelsmann and P7S1. To some extent there is a fringe 
substitution. If AS merges with P7S1, this fringe substation is omitted. Then, P7S1 
and Bertelsmann are not forced anymore to consider the prices of advertisement space 
in the Bild-Zeitung when setting their prices for TV advertising, which leads to a 
strengthening of the duopoly. The omission of the fringe substitution cannot be lim-
ited in effect on P7S1. These are effects that affect competition on the overall TV 
advertising market and, thus, benefit the duopoly as a whole. Therefore, it cannot be 
expected that the Bild-Zeitung creates an asymmetry within the duopoly, which could 
impair parallel behaviour and lead to competition within the duopoly” (Bundeskar-
tellamt 2006: 39–40; our translation). Unfortunately, this reasoning cannot convince 
from an economic perspective. In the first place, an empirical, preferably econometric 
analysis of the substitution elasticity between TV advertising and advertising in BILD 
is completely missing. The claim seems to rest on plausibility considerations, which 
could have easily done the other way around. Notwithstanding, the economic theory 
of two-sided markets provides indication for the existence of outside competition be-
tween two platforms (e.g. TV channels and newspapers) (Roson 2005: 149). How-
ever, even if one accepts a (weak) substitutional relation
20, it remains unclear why its 
erosion in the course of the merger alleviates the asymmetry. Still, concerning the 
post-merger situation, one of the oligopolists possesses a unique newspaper and the 
other one does not. This could entail incentives for AS-P7S1 to employ the (incon-
testable) market power of BILD to strive for the market leading position in the TV 
market. With the background of a trump of the BILD calibre, why should AS-P7S1 
stay satisfied with the balanced duopoly situation? Bertelsmann-RTLGroup, on the 
other hand, can be expected to rationally anticipate the new situation. Why is it im-
probable that Bertelsmann-RTLGroup would react in a fiercely competitive way in 
order to counter AS-P7S1-threat? Altogether, several characteristics of the case sup-
                                                 
19 This entails a different problem, however. If both conglomerates became truly symmetric because 
of the merger and if the competition agency prohibited the merger on these grounds, the competi-
tive advantage of Bertelsmann-RTLGroup – being the only TV-print-media conglomerate – would 
be cemented by the competition agency. This could lead to the allegation of protecting competitors 
instead of competition. 
20 BILD is assessed as being outside the relevant market. Note that other parts of the Bundeskar-
tellamt decision view BILD and P7S1 as complementary products. See section 3.2.3. 
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port the possibility that the merger would create incentives for more competition on 
the TV advertising market.  
Interestingly enough, the Bundeskartellamt completely ignores each of these scenar-
ios. Surprisingly, it also does not analyse the possibility of a BILD-based predatory 
strategy in the TV advertising market, which would represent a possible anticompeti-
tive consequence of the conglomerate merger. It is not our aim to demonstrate the 
potential procompetitive character of the blocked merger, and we cannot preclude that 
it does not create scope for coordinated effects. However, we do not find sufficient 
economic evidence in the Bundeskartellamt decision to justify its verdict. 
3.2  Cross-media Strategies, Leveraging, and Bundling  
The analysis of the reader and advertising market for newspapers focuses on various 
possibilities of cross-media strategies as an industry-specific consequence of a con-
glomerate merger including different media markets. Albeit the proposed merger does 
not lead to a strengthening of dominant position in anyone of the affected markets, it 
may enable discrimination and bundling strategies, causing anticompetitive leverage 
effects across markets (see section 2.2). In its detailed documentation, the Bundeskar-
tellamt (2006: 41–66) distinguishes three types of (allegedly) anticompetitive cross-
media strategies: (a) price-discrimination in cross-media advertising, (b) content-
related cross-promotion, and (c) cross-media advertising campaigns. 
3.2.1  Price-Discrimination in Cross-media Advertising 
Concerning the reader market for newspapers, the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 51–53) is 
concerned that special offers, lower spot prices or corporate discounts by the TV sta-
tions of P7S1 in favour of BILD would further stabilise the newspaper`s already un-
challenged dominant position. Taking into account opportunity costs, one might ques-
tion, however, whether such a price discrimination represents a favourable strategy 
for the stations (Möschel 2005; Kuchinke/Schubert 2006). Economically, the signifi-
cance of opportunity costs sensitively depends on capacity limits in such cases. If 
P7S1 has free capacities or the ability to fill up advertising time slots not demanded 
by third parties on short notice with spots for BILD, then anticompetitive concerns 
might be justified. The capacity issue was subjected to controversy between the par-
ties with the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 52) stressing the availability of low-opportunity 
cost capacities for cross-media advertising. The overall media presence of the 
Springer media could further be enhanced by means of product placement in various 
TV shows, which is expected to be further facilitated by a new EU directive 
(Bundeskartellamt 2006: 53). In return the TV stations could also take advantage of 
the wide circulation of BILD to promote their program.  
However, next to the supply-side analysis of capacities, a demand-side analysis is 
needed. Given the already extremely dominant position and ubiquitous presence of 
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BILD, it is not self-evident that the percentage of readers, who decides to read a dif-
ferent newspaper, is prone to switch to BILD once the frequency of BILD advertising 
spots on P7S1 increases. While the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 46–49) engages in a gen-
eral analysis demonstrating that overlaps between the readers of BILD and the view-
ers of P7S1 exist, it refrains from analysing the willingness of non-BILD-readers to 
switch to BILD. The switching elasticity might be considerably low due to an explic-
itly deliberate decision of these readers to avoid BILD because of its political bias 
and controversial journalistic methods (Kuchinke/Schubert 2006: 483). 
The context of price discrimination and conglomerate markets represents to some 
extent a media-specific complex of problems, which is not particularly well analysed 
in economics. Standard economic theory on price discrimination generally relates 
more to vertical relations. Thus, in summary, while additional economic analysis 
along the outlined lines could have been helpful for clarification, the assessment of 
the Bundeskartellamt does not stand in contrast to a ‘more-economic focused’ per-
spective. 
3.2.2 Content-related  Cross-Promotion 
Besides these promotional measures, similar effects could be achieved in a more indi-
rect way through editorial measures (Bundeskartellamt 2006: 53–58). In contrast to 
the promotional measures of the previous section, the corporate media are not pro-
moted through TV spots or advertisements but within the edited content. It can be 
assumed that advertising hidden in editorial content attracts higher attention and repu-
tation than frequent TV spots (that could easily be avoided by zapping to other sta-
tions) (Gounalakis/Zagouras 2006: 1625–1626). A coherent cross-media content 
strategy, e.g. complementing and escorting each other’s ‘stories’, could enhance con-
sumer loyalty and induce P7S1-viewers to buy BILD in order to see how the story 
continues to unfold. Furthermore, established brand names, like “BILD”, could also 
be used to launch a TV show called “BILD TV”, the profitability of which is elabo-
rately discussed in the Bundeskartellamt decision, finding enhanced incentives to 
launch such a show post-merger. 
In the academic controversy accompanying the merger prohibition, Bohne (2006: 
545) and Säcker (2006) raise doubts whether journalistic cross-promotion would 
automatically strengthen AS’s dominant position on the newspapers reader market, 
referring to deviating consumer behaviour in regard to the two different media news-
papers and TV as well as to adverse reactions of consumers that well realise the 
common background of the conglomerate. Even if one accepts the prospects of cross-
promotion, however, it does not suffice to find that a merger creates scope for profit-
able business strategies. Quite the contrary, one would expect higher profitability to 
be both major motivation and major benefit (efficiency gains) of mergers. It becomes 
the decisive issue whether the profitable strategy decreases or enhances consumer 
welfare. Therefore, from a more-economic approach perspective, the relevant ques-
tion is not merely whether cross-promotion is “commercially reasonable” (Bundeskar-
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tellamt 2006: 55) but, instead, whether such a strategy is profitable at the expense of 
consumers or because of better matching the consumer preferences. If consumers 
have a preference for a coherent journalistic offer across different media, then the 
profitability of cross-promotion goes along with increased consumer welfare and, 
thus, represents an efficient outcome. On the other hand, consumers might well value 
diversity of journalistic content. It seems probable to assume that both kinds of pref-
erences are distributed among the consumers. However, if a coherent cross-media 
journalistic offer is missing pre-merger and independent journalistic offers both in TV 
and in newspapers still exist post-merger, then an improved matching of consumer 
preferences can be concluded. Since the TV audience market is characterised by four 
independent oligopolists with comparable markets shares plus several fringe competi-
tors (see fig. 1 in section 2.1), the crucial market is the newspapers reader market. 
According to the market definition of the Bundeskartellamt, over-the-counter news-
papers and subscription newspapers represent distinguishable, separate markets. If 
this is an adequate market delineation, worries about a decreasing match of diversity 
preferences might be justified. However, some authors criticise this market definition 
and emphasise that over-the-counter and subscription newspapers represent substi-
tutes to a sufficient degree.
21
Altogether, possible beneficial effects of cross-promotion are neglected by the 
Bundeskartellamt. Instead, a form-based argumentation – which might stand in line 
with the hitherto (pre-more-economic approach) practice of assessing ‘strengthening 
dominant positions’ – is applied, and the mere prospect that BILD could improve its 
performance post-merger by a rather indirect (content) bundling strategy is assessed 
to be an anticompetitive strengthening of its dominant position – without balancing 
positive and negative welfare effects. A deeper theoretical and empirical analysis 
might or might have not eventually supported the assessment of the competition 
agency. In any case, the assessment would have been rooted more thoroughly in eco-
nomic reasoning. 
3.2.3  Cross-media Advertising Campaigns 
The Bundeskartellamt (2006: 62–66) pictures the scenario that the new conglomerate 
could profitably offer integrated advertising campaigns to third parties that comprise 
a coordinated media mix of TV and print media. It holds that the AS-P7S1-merger 
would allow providing advertisers with a unique cross-media bundle and expects two 
types of anticompetitive effects from this: (a) the dominant position of AS (BILD) in 
the newspaper advertising market would be strengthened and (b) the collective domi-
nance of the P7S1-RTLGroup-duopoly on the TV advertising market would be 
strengthened. Different from the previous sections, cross-media advertising cam-
paigns relate to advertising companies as customers instead of consumers as in the 
newspaper readers market. 
                                                 
21 See  e.g.  Wessely (1995: 140-160); Dewenter/Kaiser (2005); Säcker (2005); von Wallenberg (2007). 
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In economic terms, combining the products TV advertising (via P7S1) with newspa-
per advertising (via BILD) in order to create a new product – an integrated cross-
media advertising campaign – represents a bundling strategy (see section 2.2). Some-
what along the lines of the cross-promotion reasoning (see above section 3.2.2), the 
Bundeskartellamt concentrates on demonstrating that offering cross-media advertising 
campaigns from one source – as a bundle – represents a profitable business strategy. 
In doing so, the competition agency cites several industry studies, which show an in-
creasing demand for such integrated campaigns by the advertising industry. Inter alia, 
it is emphasised that “concerning introductory campaigns, price promotions as well as 
openings, a mix of advertising in TV and in newspapers is essential” and, explicitly 
from one of the studies, “pure TV or print campaigns are less efficient than mix cam-
paigns”.
22 Thus, the alleged anticompetitive character of cross-media advertising 
campaigns is established precisely because they are efficient, i.e. offers a customer 
surplus! This stands perfectly in line with economic theory identifying particular 
strong efficiency effects of cross-market bundling strategies when both markets are 
two-sided in character (advertising plus reader/viewer) (Rochet/Tirole 2003; Roson 
2005: 156). To put it modestly, the Bundeskartellamt comes close to an efficiency 
offence. Obviously, the profitability of this type of cross-media strategies rests on 
customer-benefiting efficiency gains instead of market power. 
Theoretical economic reasoning holds that bundling is generally efficient and wel-
fare-enhancing except of specific cases, in particular when pure bundling serves to 
leverage existing (single-firm) market power across the affected markets by squeezing 
out or deterring competitors from the target market (see above section 2.2). In the AS-
P7S1-case, the necessary market power might exist on the newspaper advertising 
market (market share AS ~ 50 % compared to next best competitor ~ 25 %). It does, 
however, not exist on the TV advertising market (market shares of both P7S1 and 
RTLGroup about 45 % each). Consequently, a leveraging of AS’s market power on 
the newspaper advertising market onto the TV advertising market, in an attempt to 
push back RTLGroup, could be subject to analysis. This could be backed by the (al-
leged) unique and unassailable market position of the BILD, which requires custom-
ers of big cross-media advertising campaigns to include advertising in BILD in their 
campaign and, thus, makes them prone to the bundle offer. However, this is not con-
sidered by the competition agency because it would obviously contradict with its as-
sessment of an uncompetitive duopoly situation on the TV advertising market that 
would become further strengthened through the merger (see above section 3.1).  
Therefore, (allegedly) anticompetitive bundling can merely serve to maintain or en-
hance AS’s market power in the newspaper advertising market (see section 2.2). 
However, since the market position of BILD has been characterised as intangible in 
any event (Bundeskartellamt 2006: 43), it remains unclear whether this effect might 
be considerable. It is hard to see how campaign customers who refrain from advertis-
                                                 
22  Both citations are our translations from the original German text in Bundeskartellamt (2006: 64). 
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ing in BILD pre-merger can now be forced or induced to include BILD in their cross-
media advertising campaign: if they wanted to advertise in a nationwide over-the-
counter newspaper, then they would be forced to BILD both pre- and post-merger. If 
they wanted to advertise in other, different print products (e.g. magazines, non-
boulevard newspapers, etc.), then the merger would not make BILD more attractive to 
them.
23 Moreover, only a mixed bundling strategy can be expected, since a significant 
part of the demand by advertisers will continue to refer either to TV advertising or to 
newspaper advertising, rendering a pure bundling strategy economically unalluring. 
As a consequence, it is not convincing from an economic perspective that the result-
ing and emphasised procompetitive efficiency and customer surplus effects are (over-
) compensated by anticompetitive deterring effects. Although a thorough balancing of 
pro- and anticompetitive effects of cross-media advertising campaigns is not provided 
by the German competition agency and, therefore, appropriate data is not available, it 
seems highly doubtful that the net effect is welfare decreasing. 
As to the alleged strengthening of the collectively dominant position on the TV adver-
tising market, the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 64–66) argues that because of increased 
offers of cross-media advertising campaigns, the competitive pressure that BILD with 
its unique market position and geographic scope exerts on the TV advertising duopoly 
is removed. However, the inclusion of this argument here seems problematic and mis-
placed. The economic logic of cross-media advertising campaigns rests on the com-
plementary character of TV and newspaper advertising for the purposes of the cus-
tomers of these bundles. In the eyes of these customers, no substitute is removed. 
Nevertheless, other customers may well view BILD as a (weak) substitute for TV 
advertising (which is why solely a mixed bundling strategy makes economically 
sense). Thus, a possible anticompetitive effect results merely for the customers not 
demanding cross-media campaigns. Furthermore, the economic literature on platform 
competition across two-sided markets emphasises that substitutional relations be-
tween two platforms (here: Free-TV channels and over-the-counter newspapers) alle-
viates market power concerns and renders anticompetitive effects of tying and bun-
dling more implausible (Roson 2005: 149–156).  
4 Conclusions 
In this article, we reviewed the Bundeskartellamt decision on the proposed merger 
between Springer and ProSiebenSat.1 from an economic point of view. It was not our 
goal to analyse whether the controversial decision by the Bundeskartellamt was cor-
rect or flawed from a legal point of view. Instead, we analysed whether the economic 
reasoning in the decision document reflects state-of-the-art economic theory on con-
glomerate mergers. Regarding such types of mergers, anticompetitive effects either do 
                                                 
23 Once again, the actually unique market position of BILD makes leveraging strategies from the 
newspapers market to the TV market plausible or at least debatable (see the preceding paragraph), 
but not vice versa. 
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not occur regularly or are more often than not overcompensated by efficiency gains, 
so that a welfare perspective demands reluctance concerning antitrust interventions. 
This is particularly true if two-sided markets like media markets are involved. How-
ever, anticompetitive conglomerate mergers are not impossible, in particular in 
neighbouring markets where there is some relationship between the products of the 
merging companies. In line with the more-economic approach in European merger 
control, a particular thorough line of argumentation, backed with particularly con-
vincing economic evidence, is necessary to justify a prohibition of a conglomerate 
merger from an economic point of view. 
We do not find the reasoning of the Bundeskartellamt entirely convincing and suffi-
ciently strong to justify a prohibition of the proposed combination from an economic 
perspective. The reasons are the following: 
−  the Bundeskartellamt fails to continuously consider consumer and customer wel-
fare as the relevant standards. 
−  positive efficiency and welfare effects of cross-media strategies are neglected. 
−  in contrast, the competition agency sometimes appears to view profitability of 
post-merger strategy options to be per se anticompetitive (efficiency offense). 
−  the incontestability of the relevant markets is not sufficiently substantiated. 
−  inconsistencies occur regarding the symmetry of the TV advertising market du-
opoly versus the unique role of BILD. 
−  the employment of modern economic instruments appears to be underdeveloped. 
Our analysis does not imply that the proposed AS-P7S1-merger would necessarily 
have been procompetitive. The requested deeper analysis could have destroyed some 
of the concerns of the competition agency, but it could also have substantiated spe-
cific concerns or even entailed neglected ones. The presented evidence against the 
merger, however, is not very convincing against the background of state-of-the-art 
competition economics. 
Thus, we conclude that the Bundeskartellamt has not embraced the European more-
economic approach in the analysed decision. It does not seem to be daring to suppose 
that the presented evidence and reasoning would not have sufficed to block the 
merger on the European level, given the ambitious standards for a prohibition of a 
conglomerate merger laid out by Tetra Laval/Sidel and GE/Honeywell. 
Eventually, two different qualifications can be raised in order to put our assessment 
into perspective. First, one can question whether the current state-of-the-art in compe-
tition economics provides an adequate framework for the treatment of conglomerate 
mergers. Perhaps, the anticompetitive risks of such mergers are underestimated in the 
current mainstream and future research will reveal contrasting insights. Second, one 
can discuss whether economic effects are overcompensated in this case by concerns 
about a reduction in diversity of opinion and threats to free speech. We do not make a 
value judgement about the relative importance of economic and non-economic as-
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pects of media concentration in this paper. However, concerns along the latter line did 
not play a role in the assessment of the Bundeskartellamt either – according to its own 
reasoning – and, therefore, cannot justify a merger prohibition against the background 
of purely economic competition concerns. 
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